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and inter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employment volatility is decreasing in 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in an economy. This insight is consistent with the fact that, empirically, input credit
is much more prominent in DEMEs compared to AEs.
JEL Classications: E24; E32; E44; F41.
Keywords: Business cycles, nancial development, nancial frictions, labor mar-
kets, large rms, search frictions, small rms.
An older version of this paper was circulated as Financial Development, Employment Heterogeneity,
and Sectoral Dynamics.
yCorresponding author. Department of Economics. University of Massachusetts, Lowell. Falmouth
Hall, Room 302; One University Avenue; Lowell, MA 01854. E-mail: epsteinb@gmail.com.
zDepartment of Economics. Tufts University, Braker Hall, 8 Upper Campus Road, Medford, MA 02155.
E-mail: Alan.Finkelstein_Shapiro@tufts.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Higher bank credit-GDP ratios are a dening characteristic of greater domestic nancial
development.1 Moreover, economies di¤er widely in their domestic bank credit-GDP ratios.
Economies also di¤er in the domestic external nancing structure of rms. Specically, small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) face relatively high barriers to access formal external nanc-
ing from banks compared to large rms, and therefore depend relatively more on informal
external nance in the form of interrm input credit. Interrm input credit is particularly
prevalent in developing and emerging economies (DEMEs) relative to advanced economies
(AEs) (see, for example, Chavis, Klapper and Love, 2011; Global Financial Development Re-
port, henceforth GFDR, 2014; OECD, 2012, and Presbitero and Rabellotti, 2016, for Latin
America; among others).2 Amid this backdrop, it is important to note that SMEs account
for large shares of total aggregate employment and employment creation, particularly in the
case of DEMEs (Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2014).
Within this context, an important question immediately follows: Does domestic nancial
development have implications for labor-market dynamics and, if so, why? The answer to
the rst part of our research question is given by a novel and robust stylized fact, which we
document in Figure 1: The existence of a negative correlation between nancial development
and aggregate unemployment volatility in DEMEs, but a positive correlation between these
1This is the denition of nancial development that we adhere to. Our work does not address issues of
nancial integration between economies, but rather domestic nancial development centered on rm credit.
Henceforth, we use the terms nancial development, nancial or credit deepening, and improved credit access
interchangeably.
2Small rms in DEMEs rank access to formal credit as one of their most important operational obstacles.
In fact, the share of total bank credit devoted to SMEs is only 20 percent in Latin America and developing
Asia, whereas this share easily surpasses 40 percent in AEs (IMF, 2014; OECD, 2015). Moreover, compared
to DEMEs, AEs tend to have higher shares of bank credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP.
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variables in AEs. This relationship is statistically signicant for DEMEs, but statistically
insignicant for AEs.
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Figure 1: Relationship between unemployment volatility and bank credit to the private sector as a percent
of GDP. Red line: OLS regression of a countrys average unemployment volatility on a countrys average
bank credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP. This regression yields: for DEMEs, a slope coe¢ cient
signicant at the 5-percent level; for AEs, a slope coe¢ cient that is insignicant. Unemployment data are
at yearly (time span varies across countries: earliest observation corresponds to 1950 and latest observation
corresponds to 2015) frequency and HP-ltered with a smoothing parameter equal to 6.25. Unemployment
data are from the International Labour Organization and the OECD. Data on credit are from Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data les, and World Bank and OECD GDP
estimates.3 Countries are sorted into advanced economies (AEs) and developing and emerging economies
(DEMEs) per the International Monetary Funds classication.
Importantly, these relationships hold even after controlling for additional relevant vari-
ables that could inuence unemployment volatility across countries, including a host of labor-
market regulation measures pertaining to hiring and ring as well as productivity.4 More-
3Unemployment data are from the International Labour Organization for: Albania, Algeria, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Korea, Luxembourga, Macau, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Unemployment Data are from the OECD for
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
4These labor-market regulation indicators are obtained from the World Banks Doing Business Report
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over, the relationship between GDP per capita, which is a standard measure of economic
development, and unemployment volatility is insignicant for both DEMEs and AEs.
To answer the second part of our research question, and motivated by our answer to the
rst part, we use a theoretical approach to shed light on economic fundamentals that may
explain the link, or lack thereof, between domestic nancial development and unemployment
volatility across countries. We develop a small open economy real business cycle model with
nancial frictions, interrm input-credit, labor search, and heterogeneous rms that, as a
benchmark, captures key structural characteristics of DEME labor and credit markets.
Guiding our analysis is the well-known fact that more nancially-developed economies
tend to have higher shares of bank credit devoted to SMEs compared to DEMEs (see Table
A3 in the Appendix). Amid this backdrop, larger rms on a stronger nancial footing
and with greater formal credit access extend interrm input credit by denition, a form
of informal external nance to SMEs.5 Indeed, an extensive theoretical and empirical
literature stresses the role of interrm input credit as a key source of external nancing for
SMEs (see, for instance, McMillan and Woodru¤, 1999, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic,
2001, Fisman and Love, 2003, Allen et al. 2007, Beck et al., 2008, Hyndman and Serio, 2010,
and GFDR, 2014).6 The importance of input credit for SMEs in select DEMEs is noted in
(2014) and include: minimum wage for a full-time worker; the ratio of the minimum wage per value added
per worker; the notice period for redundancy dismissal, and severance pay for redundance dismissal.
5See García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2010); Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013); Carbó-
Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández, and Udell (2016); and Shenoy and Williams (2017). For example, extending
trade credit allows rms to expand their customer base, to operate in a competitive environment, and also
to establish alternative insurance mechanisms against shocks. We do not model any specic microeconomic
rationales for extending trade credit and instead focus on the implications of extending interrm input credit.
6See Cuñat and Garcia-Appendini (2012) for an in-depth discussion of trade credit. Petersen and Rajan
(1997) argue that small rms, which often face credit constraints and limited access to formal nancing,
rely on suppliers to external resources. These suppliers are generally able to better monitor their customers
activities relative to banks (Jain, 2001; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Daripa
and Nilsen (2011), and Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti (2011) provide theoretical rationales behind the
use of trade credit. Pavón (2010) documents that input suppliers are the most important source of external
4
Table 1.
Table 1: Input and bank credit among SMEs for select economies
Country Input Credit Bank Credit
(% of External Financing) (% of External Financing)
Argentina 73:1 17:7
Brazil 45:2 39:9
Chile 62:7 32:5
Colombia 62:9 23:1
Mexico 62:7 17:6
Peru 40:5 42:1
Venezuela 59:2 28:9
Average 58:0 28:8
Notes: Source are authors calculations using data from OECD (2013, Table 3.A1). Input credit is given
by credit-based purchases from suppliers and advances from customers. Other sources of external nancing,
which are second-order to trade credit and bank credit, correspond to external nancing from non-bank
nancial institutions and from moneylenders, friends, and relatives. Finkelstein Shapiro and González Gómez
(2017) present similar evidence.
Importantly, as shown by Figure 2 for a broader set of DEMEs, the share of alternative
nancing sources of which input credit is the most important in total external nancing is
inversely related to the share of bank credit in total external nancing. Of note, relationship
is statistically signicant and it does not hold by construction as rms can, in principle, tap
into non-bank credit market nance as well.7
nancing for small rms in Mexico, accounting for almost 70 percent of total external nancing. This share
is decreasing in rm size, with commercial banks being comparatively more relevant among larger rms.
In other developing and emerging economies (DEMEs) roughly 60 percent of total external nance comes
from trade credit (Table A5 in the Appendix). As the Appendix shows in more detail, similar evidence
holds in other DEMEs, where more than 50 percent of small-rm entrepreneurs cite increased search for
input suppliers to obtain external nance support (see Tables A1, A2, A3, and A5 in the Appendix; IDB,
2005; GFDR, 2014). Furthermore, in-kind-based trade credit relationships are more likely to take place
in economies with weaker institutional quality (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Of note, trade credit is, by
nature, relationship-based as opposed to spot-market-based. In fact, survey-based evidence conrms SMEs
search e¤orts to nd supplier-based, non-bank external nancing (Table A1 in the Appendix). Finkelstein
Shapiro and González Gómez (2017) discuss the relevance of input credit and supplier relationships in detail
as well.
7Of note, recent studies have shown that some rms resort to self-nancing in order to overcome limited
access to external nancing. At the same time, rmsnancing patterns evolve as rms age (see, for example,
Midrigan and Xu, 2014). Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2016) document that, in contrast with publicly-traded
rms who primarily nance the bulk of their investment internally, privately-held rms nance most of their
investment using external nancing. Publicly-traded rms represent a minuscule share of rms in DEMEs
as most rms in DEMEs tend to be small (GFDR, 2014). As such, our work focuses only on privately-traded
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Figure 2: Alternative nancing sources versus bank credit, both as a percent of total external nancing. Data
source: Allen, Carletti, Quianc, and Valenzuela (2012). Red line: OLS regression of alternative nancing
(as a percent of total external nancing) on bank nancing (as a percent of total external nancing). This
regression yields a slope coe¢ cient that is signicant at the 1-percent level.8
Our framework successfully replicates key labor market and business cycle properties of a
representative DEME with quality labor market data: Mexico. We capture the relative im-
portance of input credit among SMEs noted earlier by assuming two rm categories labeled
largeand small.While both rm categories use labor (hired via frictional markets) and
internally-accumulated capital to produce, we assume that small rms also rely on capital
supplied by large rms via input credit. This assumption embodies the relative reliance of
small rms on informal external nance vis-à-vis large rms documented in the literature
on input credit. Given our focus on nancial development, our notion of small rms is not
related to size or age per se, but instead to the di¤erential external nancing sources and
rms who, as suggested by existing evidence, do rely on (bank- and non-bank-based) external nancing to
operate. In addition, given our focus on business cycles and di¤erences across countries and not on rmslife
cycle patterns, we follow the literature on labor search frictions and business cycle dynamics and abstract
from rm-age considerations.
8Country sample: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belaruz, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,
Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukrain, Venezuela, and Vietnam. These countries fall into the DEME category per the
International Monetary Funds classication.
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the degree to which certain rms are less constrained in their access to bank credit.
Our model analysis of the impact of nancial development on labor market dynamics
suggests that unemployment volatility is decreasing in the borrowing capacity of small and/or
large rms as long as input credit is su¢ ciently prominent in small-rm production amid
business cycle uctuations driven by productivity and borrowing nancial shocks. Intuitively,
an improvement in rmsborrowing capacity boosts the accumulation of capital, which makes
rms more resilient to credit disruptions and stabilizes the demand for input credit. These
dynamics make vacancy postings and therefore unemployment less volatile for any given set
of shocks. This mechanism is always at play, regardless of the degree of input credit in an
economy. However, we show that the greater the degree of input credit in an economy, the
greater the explicit linkages between large and small rms. In fact, for a su¢ ciently low
degree of input credit the relationship between nancial development and unemployment
volatility is for all purposes mute. These results are consistent with the relative importance of
interrm input credit in DEMEs versus AEs. Therefore, our work puts forth the importance
of input credit as a novel and key amplication channel by which nancial development can
lead to lower unemployment volatility.
The international business cycle literature has emphasized the role of interest rate shocks
for business cycles in DEMEs (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Li, 2011; Chang and Fernández,
2013; Boz, Durdu, and Li, 2015). Recent literature has incorporated nancial frictions
(e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012; Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shi,
2014; Iacoviello, 2015) into settings with frictional labor markets in a DEME context (Lama
and Urrutia, 2011; Fernández and Herreño, 2012; Finkelstein Shapiro and González Gómez,
2017). In turn, a number of studies have explored the empirical connection between nancial
7
development, growth, and aggregate volatility (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine,
2004; Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni, 2006; Aghion, Bacchetta, Rancière, and Rogo¤, 2009;
Manganelli and Popov, 2012; Wang and Wen, 2013), and also between nancial development
and rm dynamics (Arellano, Bai, and Zhang, 2012). While certain studies have explored
the importance of sectoral heterogeneity (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2004;
Manganelli and Popov, 2012; Dabla-Norris, Ji, Townsend, and Unsal, 2015), few, if any, have
considered the implications for labor market dynamics.
Relative to existing literature, to the best of our knowledge our paper is the rst to:
highlight a robust stylized fact explicitly linking nancial development to cyclical labor
market dynamics; and to stress the importance of rmsexternal nancing structure along
with rm heterogeneity in access to credit towards understanding a link between nancial
development and unemployment volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section
3 describes the models operationalization and main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is directly related to Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017) with regards to
production, reliance on input-credit by a set of rms, and the labor market, and Epstein,
Finkelstein Shapiro, and González Gómez (2017) with regards to nancial frictions and
collateral constraints in a context of production heterogeneity. In turn, this last paper
builds on Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Iacoviello (2015).
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2.1 Domestic Financial Intermediaries
In order to analyze the relevance of rm heterogeneity amid nancial development, both small
(household) rms and large rms must face collateral constraints and are therefore considered
borrowers. As such, domestic nancial intermediaries or banks can e¤ectively be seen as
suppliers of external funds to borrower rms. We assume that nancial intermediaries have a
unit mass and are a distinct agent that chooses large- and small-rm loan amounts ll;t and ls;t,
respectively, and consumption cb;t to maximize E0
P1
t=0
t
bu(cb;t) subject to the constraints
cb;t = Rt 1lt 1   lt, where: lt = ll;t + ls;t; and u0 > 0; u00 < 0. The subjective discount factor
is b 2 (0; 1) and Rt is the gross lending rate for large and small rms.9 The rst-order
conditions yield u0(cb;t) = bEtu0(cb;t+1)Rt.
2.2 Large Firm Entrepreneurs
We assume that large rms can choose howmuch of their internally-accumulated capital stock
to use in their own production and how much of this capital to rent out to small rms our
notion of input-credit.10 Large-rm entrepreneurs have a unit mass and choose consumption
cl;t, desired employment (denoted nl;t+1 from the demand side perspective) vacancies vl;t,
capital kl;t+1, the fraction of existing capital to be used within the rm !t, and borrowed
funds ll;t to maximize E0
P1
t=0 
t
lu(cl;t) (where u
0 < 0 and u00 < 0) subject to: the resource
9The Appendix discusses the results from introducing costly nancial intermediation, which generates an
explicit spread between lending and deposit rates based on Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), as well as higher
lending rates for small rms relative to large rms. Our results remain the same if we characterize nancial
development by a joint improvement in borrowing capacity and a reduction in both intermediation costs and
interest rate spreads.
10See, for example, Finkelstein Shapiro (2014) and Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017) for richer
specications with frictional input credit markets.
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constraint
cl;t = pl;tyl;t   wl;tnl;t   (vl;t)  il;t + ll;t  Rt 1ll;t 1
+(rs;t + 
o   ) (1  !t)kl;t,
where pl;t is the price of output, yl;t is output (yl;t = zl;tF(nl;t; !tkl;t), F is constant returns
to scale, and zl;t is exogenous sectoral productivity), wl;t is the wage, vl;t are vacancies
that are posted at a cost (vl;t) with 0 > 0 and 00 > 0, il;t is investment, and rs;t is
the input-credit capital rental rate; standard laws of motion for employment and capital,
nl;t+1 = (1   l) (nl;t + vl;tql;t) (where l is the exogenous job-destruction probability and
ql;t is the endogenous job lling probability), and kl;t+1 = (1   )kl;t + il;t (where  is the
depreciation rate of capital), respectively; a collateral constraint Rtll;t + wl;tnl;t  l;tkl;t+1.
Note that in equilibrium, the measure of small rm owners os;t must be equal to the supply
of unused capital by large rms, (1   !t)kl;t. Moreover, we assume that any depreciated
input-credit capital net of the exogenous depreciation of input credit other than physical-
capital depreciation o is covered by large rms. This assumption is captured by the term
(o   )(1  !t)kl;t.
The sectoral collateral constraint follows Quadrini (2012) and Iacoviello (2015).11 And,
following this literature we assume that l < b, which guarantees that the constraint
holds with equality. Also, note that l;t determines the rms borrowing capacity: all else
equal a larger value of l;t is consistent with the rms existing capital being worth more
as collateral.12 (We assume that l;t has mean l and follows a stochastic process, and the
11For a two-sector application, see Epstein, Finkelstein Shapiro, and González Gómez (2017).
12The collateral constraint assumes that the rm must nance the entirety of the wage bill, which is
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rms total wage bill must be paid in advance see, for instance, Neumeyer and Perri, 2005;
Iacoviello, 2015).
Large-rm optimization yields the following 4 equations. First, the large-rm Euler
equation
1  l;tl;t = Etlt+1jt (pl;t+1zl;t+1F!kl;t+1) + (1  ),
where: l;t is the (collateral) multiplier on the large rms borrowing constraint normalized
by the marginal utility of large-rm consumption; and lt+1jt  lu0(cl;t+1)=u0(cl;t) is the large
rms stochastic discount factor. Intuitively, the marginal cost of accumulating capital (the
left-hand side of this equation, which is decreasing in the collateral multiplier and borrowing
capacity) is optimally set equal to the marginal benet (the right hand side of this equation,
which is increasing in the stochastic discount factor and the marginal revenue product of
capital, but decreasing in the capital depreciation rate).
Second, the large-rm job creation condition
0(vl;t)
ql;t
= (1  l)Etlt+1jt

pl;t+1zl;t+1Fnl;t+1   wl;t+1 [1 + l;t+1] +
0(vl;t+1)
ql;t+1

,
which equates the expected marginal cost of posting an additional vacancy (which is equal
to the marginal cost of a posting a vacancy per the expected duration of the position being
vacant) to the expected benet of lling an open vacancy with an additional worker (which
is increasing in the stochastic discount factor, the marginal revenue product of labor, and the
continuation value of a match, but decreasing in a workers wage adjusted for the collateral
standard in related literature assuming that only a fraction of the wage bill needs to be nanced does not
change our main results. A similar comment applies to small rms below.
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multiplier as a reection of the fact that the rm must nance the wage bill, and also
decreasing in the exogenous separation probability).
Third, the large-rm input-credit supply condition
pl;tzl;tF!kl;t = rs;t + (
o   ),
which equates the marginal cost of devoting a unit of capital to a small rm (which is equal
to the marginal revenue product of capital) to the marginal benet (the rental rate and the
value of a depreciated unit of capital).
Fourth, an optimal borrowing condition, 1 Rtl;t = Etlt+1jtRt, which equates the mar-
ginal benet from borrowing funds (which is decreasing in the gross lending rate and the
collateral multiplier) to the expected discounted gross rate on borrowed funds (see, for in-
stance, Iacoviello, 2015). Rearranging this last equation to yield 1=Rt   l;t = Etlt+1jt it
follows that a rise in the gross lending rate or an increase in the collateral multiplier both
put downward pressure on the large-rms stochastic discount factor.
2.3 Small Firms and Households
Following a frictionless input-credit version of Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017), we
assume that each small rm uses one and only one unit of input-credit capital to produce
(assuming variable input-credit utilization within a given rm does not change our results).13
Even though small rms can accumulate capital internally, a prerequisite for the existence of
a small rm (and therefore, a small-rm owner) is that it relies on input-credit as an input
13We note that modeling input-credit relationships via capital search, as in Finkelstein Shapiro (2014) and
Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017), does not change any of our conclusions.
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supplied by a large rm. Also, as shown below, household members can be engaged in 4
economic activities: (1) employed in a small rm; (2) employed in a large rm; (3) being a
small rm owner; (4) or unemployed. There is no labor force participation margin and the
labor force is normalized to one.
Similar to Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017), total prots for small rms are
s;t = [ps;tzs;tF (ns;t; ks;t; os;t)  ws;tns;t   is;t]
 rs;tos;t   (vs;t)os;t + ls;t  Rt 1ls;t 1,
where: ps;t is the price of output; ys;t is output (ys;t = zs;tF (ns;t; ks;t; os;t), F is constant-
returns-to-scale, and zs;t is exogenous sectoral productivity); ns;t is the measure of small-rm
salaried workers from the demand-side perspective (Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro, 2017);
ks;t is the internally-accumulated capital stock; is;t denotes total small rm investment in
capital ks;t; os;t is the measure of small rm owners (given our assumption of one unit of
input credit per small rm, os;t is also the measure of input-credit capital); ws;t is the wage;
rs;t is the input-credit-capital rental rate; the cost of vacancy creation per small rm owner is
(vs;t) with 0 > 0 and 00 > 0; and small rms borrow external funds ls;t at a gross interest
rate R.14
Households have a unit mass and own small rms and make decisions for these rms from
an input-demand perspective. Note that we allow households to hold foreign debt to follow
the literature on DEME business cycles. Importantly, given that households account for the
14Given that os;t is the measure of small rm owners and all rms have the same exogenous
productivity and a constant-returns production technology, dividing s;t by os;t yields prots
per small rm.
13
bulk of total consumption in the model, this assumption gives households an instrument to
smooth consumption. At the same time, the presence of collateral constraints implies that
the lending rate and foreign interest rate will di¤er as a result of a positive multiplier on the
collateral constraint. This can be rationalized as follows: the positive collateral constraint
multiplier may embody other factors (di¤erential access to credit markets, intermediation
costs that may di¤er between rms and individuals, etc.) which we do not explicitly model
and that imply a discrepancy between the cost of borrowing for rms and the cost of accessing
foreign assets by households.15
Households choose consumption ch;t, foreign debt bt , desired demand for small-rm work-
ers ns;t+1, the desired measure of small rm owners os;t+1, resources devoted towards estab-
lishing small rms st, internal capital ks;t+1, vacancies vs;t, and borrowed funds ls;t from
domestic nancial intermediaries to maximize E0
P1
t=0 
t
hu(ch;t) (u
0 > 0 and u00 < 0) subject
to the budget constraint16
ch;t +  (st) +R

t 1b

t 1 = s;t +t + ws;tn
s
s;t + wl;tn
s
l;t + b

t ,
a law of motion for capital ks;t+1 = (1 )ks;t+is;t, the perceived law of motion for small-rm
labor input ns;t+1 = (1   s) (ns;t + os;tvs;tqs;t), the evolution of small rm owners os;t+1 =
(1   o) (os;t +Mkst), where Mk is scaling parameter, and a borrowing constraint Rtls;t 
ws;tns;t  s;tks;t+1, where  (st) is a resource cost with 0 (st) > 0 and 00 (st) > 0; households
receive income from nal-goods rm prots, t, large- and small-rm workers, wl;tnsl;t and
15Of note, abstracting from foreign debt (which would imply a closed economy) does not change any of
our conclusions.
16As such, households can be seen as hiring small-rm workers for their rms by posting vacancies to
attract unemployed members from households other than their own.
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ws;tn
s
s;t, and take these prots and wages as given -n
s
l and n
s
s denote sectoral employment
from the supply-side perspective and in the absence of labor force participation decisions,
nsl and n
s
s are taken as given by the household; R

t is the gross foreign interest rate on
foreign debt and Rt = R
+b [exp(b

t   b)  1] with b > 0 and steady-states R and b
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003); qs;t is the endogenous job-lling probability; and workers
are separated from small rms with exogenous probability s. Finally, s;t determines the
rms borrowing capacity (all else equal a larger value of s;t is consistent with the small
rms existing capital being worth more as collateral).
Small-rm and household optimization yield the following 5 conditions. First, a standard
Euler equation for foreign debt, 1=Rt = Etht+1jt, where: ht+1jt  hu0(ch;t+1)=u0(ch;t) is the
households stochastic discount factor. Second, an input-credit demand condition
0(st) = (1  o)Etht+1jt f[ps;t+1zs;t+1Fos;t+1   ro;t+1   (vs;t+1)] + 0(st+1)g ,
where the marginal cost of getting input credit (or, equivalently, having an additional small
rm owner) is equal to the expected marginal benet of doing so. This is akin to a standard
capital Euler equation, but in our case with regards to input credit (i.e. small rm owners
given our assumption of one unit of input credit per small rm).
Third, a job creation condition
0(vs;t)
qs;t
= (1  s)Etht+1jt

ps;t+1zs;t+1Fns;t+1   ws;t+1 [1 + s;t+1] +
0(vs;t+1)
qs;t+1

.
where: s;t is the multiplier on the small rms borrowing constraint normalized by the
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marginal utility of small-rm consumption. Fourth, a standard internal-capital accumulation
condition, 
1  s;ts;t

= Etht+1jt fps;t+1zs;t+1Fks;t+1 + (1  )g .
And fth, an optimal borrowing condition, 1   Rts;t = Etht+1jtRt. The interpretation of
these last 3 equations is entirely akin to their large-rm counterparts.
2.4 Closing the Model
Dene unemployment as ut  1 nl;t ns;t os;t. The functions ml;t = ml(vl;,ut) and ms;t
= ms(vs;tos;t,ut) are standard constant returns to scale matching functions. The job-nding
probabilities are fj;t = mj;t=ut and for j 2 fl; sg. In turn, the job-lling probabilities are qs;t
=ms;t=(vs;tos;t) and ql;t =ml;t=vl;t. Labor market tightness in each sector is s;t  (vs;tos;t)=ut
and l;t  vl;t=ut. All salaried job-nding probabilities are increasing in labor tightness.
Wages are determined via Nash bargaining. Due to di¤erences in the discount factors
between households and rms and the timing of the matching processes, no closed-form so-
lution for wages can be obtained. For expositional briefness, the relevant value functions and
Nash bargaining problems that implicitly dene these prices are presented in the Appendix.17
Total output aggregates large- and small-rm output using the constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) function yt = y(yl;t; ys;t). Final goods rms maximize prots t = [y(yl;t; ys;t)
17The Appendix also presents implicit expressions for wl and ws that show how wages are inuenced
by (1) formal credit market conditions (embodied in l and s via rmsdiscount factors), (2) marginal
productivities, and (3) sectoral market tightness in their own employment category and in other categories.
Of note, volatility in credit conditions inuences how rms value future employment relationships, which
a¤ects hiring decisions. Also, the hiring decisions of rms in a given sector have spillover e¤ects on the
decisions of rms (and households) in other sectors by a¤ecting employment outside options (i.e., sectoral
market tightness). Therefore, as nancial development takes place, the variability of salaried labor and credit
market conditions due to productivity and nancial disturbances changes.
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pl;tyl;t ps;tys;t], where the price of nal output is normalized to 1. We obtain standard
relative prices for large and small rm output, pl;t = yyl(yl;t; ys;t) and ps;t = yys(yl;t; ys;t),
respectively.
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is
yt = ct + il;t + is;t + (st) + (vl;t) + (vs;t)os;t + tbt,
where: ct = ch;t + cl;t + cb;t is total consumption; and the trade balance is dened as
tbt Rt 1bt 1 bt .
3 Operationalization and Results
3.1 Operationalization
We assume that ln zj;t = (1  %z) ln(zj) + %z ln zj;t 1 + "zt for j 2 fl,sg, where zj is a sector-
specic parameter, %z2 (0; 1), and "zt  N(0; 2z) denotes the aggregate productivity shock.
Similarly, sectoral borrowing capacity follows an AR(1) process with a common nancial
shock: ln j;t = (1   %) ln(j) + % ln j;t 1 + "t for j 2 fl; sg, where j is a sector-specic
parameter, %j2 (0; 1), and "

t N(0; 2).
A time period is 1 quarter. Table 2 summarizes the functional forms we use. Note that
although not stated in the model description for expositional simplicity, following related
literature, we introduce standard capital adjustment costs  (kj;t; kj;t+1).
Also, as shown in Table 2, in the functional form for F (ns;t; ks;t; os;t), k determines
the relative importance of capital obtained via input credit in the production function of
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small rms. Intuitively, k and the ease with which rms can access nancial credit may
be endogenously related, for instance, if greater nancial credit pushes small rms to reduce
their dependence on input credit. However, we remain purposefully agnostic about this
potentially endogenous relationship, since this approach allows us to carefully dissect the
importance of each of the models ingredients in a disciplined and transparent way. Recall
that our objective is not to explain the external nancing structure of rms, but rather to
shed light on the implications for labor-market dynamics of rmsexisting external nancing
structure.
Table 2: Functional forms
Variable Functional Form Notes
yt
h
ay

l;t + (1  a) yas;t
i 1
a a 2 (0; 1) and a 1
F (ns;t; ks;t; os;t) (ns;t)
1 s (os;t)k (ks;t)1 s s 2 (0; 1)
F(nl;t; !tkl;t) (nl;t)1 l (!tkl;t)l l2 (0; 1)
ml;t Ml (ut)
 (vl;t)
1  Ml is match scaling
and  is match elasticity
ms;t Ms (ut)
 (vs;tos;t)
1  Ms is match scaling
and  is match elasticity
 (kj;t; kj;t+1) ('k=2) (kj;t+1=kj;t   1)2 kj;t for j2 fl;sg; standard in related literature
(st)  k (st)
k  k; k > 0; Merz and Yashiv (2007)
(vj;t)  j (vj;t)
v  j; v > 0 for j2 fl;sg;
standard in related literature
u(cj) c
1 
j = (1  ) j > 0 for j2 fl;sg;
standard in related literature
Table 3 summarizes the parameter values we adopt. A standard assumption in models
with collateral constraints is that b > h; l (see, for instance, Iacoviello, 2015), which
we implement, so that rmscollateral constraints are always binding.18 Of course, while
empirically rms may not always face binding nancing constraints over the business cycle,
our main objective is to explore the cyclical unemployment implications of improving rms
18We experiment and nd that our conclusions do not hinge on other plausible values for b, h, and l.
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access to credit relative to a baseline, more constrained economy. As such, our quantita-
tive analysis abstracts from occasionally binding constraints as these are not central to our
focus.19
Table 3: Parameter Assumptions
Parameter Value Notes
l 0:320 Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017)
s 0:270 Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017)
b 0:985 Binding collateral constraint; Iacoviello (2015)
h 0:885 Binding collateral constraint; Iacoviello (2015)
l 0:885 Binding collateral constraint; Iacoviello (2015)
 0:025 Standard in related literature
j 2:000 j 2 fl; s; og; Merz and Yashiv (2007)20
 0:500 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)21
a 0:700 Benchmark; Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017)
22
l 0:030 Bosch and Maloney (2008)
s 0:070 Bosch and Maloney (2008)
o 0:040 Bosch and Maloney (2008)
%z 0:950 Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
 2:000 Standard in related literature
zs 1:000 Normalization; see Appendix for details
zl 2:219 Busso, Fazio, and Levy (2012); see Appendix for details
Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameters used in our benchmark simulation. We
use Mexico as a reference DEME given its rich labor market data. We note that s > l may
initially seem at odds with the well-known severity of nancing constraints among small
rms. However, we stress that rms also di¤er in their steady-state levels of internally-
accumulated capital. In particular, small rms have less capital and it is the total borrowing
19Of note, a related segment of the literature on nancial frictions focuses on the misallocation and total-
factor-productivity implications of these constraints as part of the development process (see Buera, Kaboski,
and Shin, 2011; Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shi, 2014; among others). Since our focus is not on misallocation
or micro-level di¤erences in rm productivity, we stay close to well-known studies on business cycles and
nancial frictions.
20Our value implies that the total resource cost from vacancy posting in the benchmark calibration is
around 1 percent of output, in line with the literature (Boz, Durdu, and Li, 2015).
21In line with related literature, the bargaining power of all types of workers is  = 0:5. Our conclusions
do not change if we assume that  and/or  di¤er at the sectoral level.
22This value implies a relatively high degree of imperfect substitutability between sectoral
output (other reasonable values, whether higher or lower, do not change our conclusions).
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capacity, lkl for large rms and sks for small rms, that ultimately matters for the relative
sensitivity of rms to shocks. Indeed, controlling for rmsdi¤erential internal capital levels,
the total borrowing capacity of large rms is much higher than the one for small rms. That
is, in the steady state, lkl > sks. Thus, the calibrated values for l and s are consistent
with large rms having better access to formal nancing relative to small rms as suggested
by existing empirical evidence.
Regarding employment shares, according to Mexicos National Survey on Urban Employ-
ment and National Survey on Occupation and Employment, the share of self-employment in
Mexico is close to 23 percent (a lower bound). Around 30 percent of those self-employed work
in rms with more than one worker (that is, in salaried rms). Hence the share of small rm
owners we use in our benchmark calibration. In the model, the self-employed are accounted
for in the share of workers in small rms since, similar to small-rm salaried workers, self-
employment is countercyclical. Also, as noted in Epstein and Finkelstein Shapiro (2017), the
fact that Ms>Ml should not be taken as implying that large rms are less e¢ cient at hiring
than small rms, but instead may reect aspects of the economic environment that we are
not explicitly modeling (institutional or regulatory factors that a¤ect the matching process,
for example). Moreover, the values for these matching parameters imply higher job-nding
probabilities for small-rm employment relative to large-rm employment, which is consis-
tent with evidence from Bosch and Maloney (2008) (where informal employment is mainly
concentrated in small rms).
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Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Notes
l 0:291 Match Mexico empirical average domestic credit-to-GDP
ratio (=0.20; World Bank Development Indicators)
s 0:614 Match share of credit to small rms in sample of DEMEs
(= 0.10; OECD, 2012)
k 0:650 Match Mexico distribution of capital stock across rms
Busso, Fazio, and Levy (2012) for Mexico.
b 0:673 Match Mexico (steady-state) foreign debt-to-GDP ratio
(= 0.30; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007)
Ml 0:076 Match nl = 0:40 in Mexico (statistical agencies)
Ms 0:448 Match ns = 0:48 in Mexico (statistical agencies)
Mk 0:027 Match os = 0:07 in Mexico (statistical agencies)
 l 0:034 Vacancy cost is 3.5 percent of sectoral wages (Levy, 2007)
 s 0:011 Vacancy cost is 3.5 percent of sectoral wages (Levy, 2007)
 k 0:320 Capital-search cost equals 3 months of sectoral wages
(McKenzie and Woodru¤, 2008)
a 0:341 Match (pl  yl)=y=0:55 in Mexico (Busso, Fazio, and Levy, 2012
, and Enterprise Surveys)
b 0:010 Stationary debt holdings without a¤ecting aggregate
dynamics (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003)
'k 32:140 Match investment volatility relative to output
in Mexico (1993:Q1-2007:Q4)
z 0:017 Match output volatility in Mexico (1993:Q1-2007:Q4)
% 0:900 Persistence of output in Mexico (1993:Q1-2007:Q4)
 0:028 Cyclical correlation between output and wages
in Mexico (1993:Q1-2007:Q4)
Given the large number of state variables, global solution methods become highly in-
tractable. Therefore, we log-linearize the model around the non-stochastic steady state and
use a rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions. The model is simulated for
2100 periods. The rst 100 periods are discarded, and an HP lter with smoothing parameter
1600 is applied to the remaining series.
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3.2 Business Cycle Moments
Business cycle uctuations in the benchmark model are driven by productivity and borrowing
capacity (nancial) shocks, only. Table 5 shows business cycle statistics for Mexico (Data)
and compares them to results from our benchmark economy (Model). The model performs
well in quantitatively capturing the cyclical properties of the data on all fronts, except the
volatility of unemployment. Of note, the benchmark model: successfully generates standard
deviations of consumption and wages higher than the standard deviation of output, which is
a well-known feature of DEMEs (Boz, Durdu, and Li, 2015); generates a countercylical trade
balance-output ratio;23 generates a factual autocorrelation of unemployment. and generates
factual correlations with output of both large- and small-rm employment.24
The limited ability to generate overall high unemployment volatility is a well-known
and well-documented reection of the Shimer puzzle (Shimer, 2005). Addressing this
common limitation of search models lies outside the scope of our work as we are interested
in di¤erences in unemployment volatility across di¤erent nancial development equilibria.
As such, not being able to exactly match the volatility of unemployment is of entirely second
order for our purposes.
23Removing the wage bill from rmscollateral constraints improves the countercyclicality of the trade
balance-output ratio, but reduces the volatility of wages somewhat. However, it is still the case that both
wages and consumption remain more volatile relative to output, as in the data. Results available upon
request.
24The majority of formal salaried workers are in large rms and the majority of informal workers are
in small rms (Busso, Fazio, and Levy, 2012). This explains why, given our mapping between the data
and the model, small rm employment is countercyclical (for empirical evidence, see Bosch and Maloney,
2008; Fernández and Meza, 2015). Within the context of our model with formal nancing, this mapping
is an approximation as many small rms (which are generally informal) may not have full access to formal
nancing, though this fact is reected in the collateral constraint (adjusted for the level of capital) for small
rms. The mapping we use is not problematic since a share of small rms do indeed have access to formal
nancing (World Bank Enterprise Surveys). As shown in Table 5, it is worth highlighting that the model is
consistent with specic second moments of the labor market that we do not target, which adds considerable
validity to our framework.
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Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics, Data vs. Model
A. Targeted moments
Statistic yt i;t (yt; yt 1) (wt; yt)
Data 2:390 6:644 0:750 0:560
Model 2:390 6:644 0:745 0:566
B. Non-targeted moments
Statistic c;t w;t ut (nl;t; yt) (ns;t; yt) (ut; yt) (ut;ut 1) (tbt=yt; yt)
Data 3:011 4:701 20:66 0:740  0:470  0:780 0:840  0:750
Model 2:814 3:441 0:764 0:645  0:168  0:549 0:874  0:333
Notes: x refers to the standard deviation of variable x. (x; y) refers to the correlation of x with y. All
second moments for the model are obtained using ltered series to make them comparable to the data. The
empirical moments for large-rm and small-rm employment are based on data from Mexicos employment
survey (ENEU). The empirical volatility of consumption and wages, the cyclicality of unemployment, and
the persistence of output and unemployment are from Boz, Durdu, and Li (2015).
3.3 Financial Development
In order to study the link between nancial development and unemployment volatility, we
focus on three parameters: l (the large rms steady-state borrowing capacity); s (the small
rms steady-state borrowing capacity); and k (which determines the relative importance
of matched capital obtained via input credit in the production function of small rms).25
Recall that a higher k implies that, all else equal, small-rm production is more intensive
in input credit; that is, small rms rely relatively more on informal external nance.26
Figure 3 plots the economys steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio and unemployment
volatility for di¤erent combinations of l and k (top two panels) and of s and k (bottom
two panels), respectively.27 In each graph the benchmark calibration point is highlighted
25See Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) for a related approach that studies nancial development.
26Of note, as part of our robustness analysis below, we show that having di¤erences in borrowing capacity
between large and small rms (that is l 6= s as opposed to l = s = ), which reect small rmsmore
constrained status relative to large rms as in the data, is important for quantitatively explaining the link
between nancial development and unemployment volatility.
27For consistency with Table 5, Figure 3 is generated using simulated data at quarterly frequency. We
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with a white dot. Note that, all else equal, a higher borrowing capacity among large or small
rms (l or s) is associated with a higher steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio. In contrast,
all else equal a higher share of input-credit-capital in production (k) is associated with a
lower steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio.
Note from Figure 3 that the parameter combinations for l, s, k generate the range of
steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio that matches the empirical range of this variable as shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 3: Impact of changes in key parameter values on the steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio and unem-
ployment volatility (benchmark model).
Also, per Figure 3 unemployment volatility is decreasing under, all else equal, higher
l and, all else equal, higher s, but only at high values of k (i.e., when interrm input
credit is a relatively important component among small rms, as is the case in DEMEs).
For low values of k, improvements in rmsborrowing capacity have virtually no impact
note that the main results are qualitatively identical if we consider simulations at a yearly frequency.
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on unemployment volatility, as is the case in AEs. So, unemployment volatility is always
rising in k, but the rate at which unemployment volatility is decreasing in l and s is
decreasing in k: Similarly, from the perspective of nancial development reected in rms
domestic external nancing structure, unemployment volatility is rising in k (which itself is
negatively correlated with the steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio), but only for low levels
of rmsborrowing capacity l and s.
Keeping Figure 3 in mind, recall from the facts in the Introduction that, all else equal,
there exists a markedly negative and statistically signicant relationship between unemploy-
ment volatility and nancial development in DEMEs, and a slightly positive though statis-
tically insignicant relationship between nancial development and unemployment volatility
in AEs (even after controlling for other potential factors that may inuence the volatility
of unemployment). Furthermore, recall that interrm input credit is a key characteristic of
small rmsexternal nancing structure in DEMEs but plays a less signicant role in AEs,
where rms rely relatively more on more formal sources of external nancing.
All told, we conclude that the model can successfully generate both the factual nega-
tive relationship between domestic nancial development and unemployment volatility in
DEMEs and also the factual disconnect between domestic nancial development and unem-
ployment volatility in AEs documented in Figure 1. In doing so, the model suggests that the
statistically signicant negative correlation between unemployment volatility and nancial
development observed in DEMEs can be traced back to increases in rmsborrowing capacity
occurring amid a high degree of input-credit relevance in production. In contrast, the statis-
tically insignicant relationship between unemployment volatility and nancial development
observed in AEs can be traced back to increases in rmsborrowing capacity occurring amid
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a low degree of input-credit relevance in production.
Of course, taken together these results suggest that an endogenous negative relationship
between nancial development and input-credit relevance in production (or, more broadly,
rmsexternal-nancing structure) may exist, which is intuitive. However, as noted earlier,
we have purposefully taken an agnostic modeling approach to pinpoint in a disciplined and
transparent way the key features of an economys domestic rm-external-nancing structure
that can rationalize the stylized facts observed in the empirical data.
3.4 Economic Mechanisms
Figure 4 sheds light on the driving forces behind our main results. This gure shows: the
volatility of large-rm and small-rm employment and wages (top 4 panels); the volatility of
the share of large-rm capital devoted as input credit to small rms, ! (bottom left panel);
and the volatility of unemployment (bottom right panel). (Similar patterns are observed for
all of these variables when we change l and k the interpretation for which is entirely akin to
that stated further below recall that changes in l and s have the same qualitative impact
on unemployment volatility; so, without loss of generality we focus on nancial development
equilibria based on changes in s and k.) The volatility of all variables depicted in Figure
4 is: decreasing in k; and decreasing in l only at relatively high values of k.
26
Figure 4: Impact of changes in key parameter values on: sectoral employment volatility; sectoral wage
volatility; fraction of large-rm capital devoted to input-credit volatility; unemployment volatility (bench-
mark model).
To understand the results shown in Figure 4, note that an improvement in small rms
borrowing capacity s amid productivity and nancial shocks boosts the accumulation of
capital. This higher capital stock, all else equal, makes rms more resilient to credit dis-
ruptions, in turn making vacancy postings less volatile for a given set of shocks. Therefore,
small-rm employment becomes more stable. Critically, this greater employment stability
also stabilizes the demand for input credit, which leads to a fall in the volatility of !. All else
equal, this fall in the volatility of ! stabilizes large rmsprots and vacancy postings and,
as a result, large-rm employment as well. So, both large-rm and small-rm employment,
and ultimately aggregate unemployment, become less volatile amid nancial development.
This mechanism is always at play, regardless of the degree of input credit in an economy
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(as captured by k). However, the greater the degree of input credit in an economy, the
greater the explicit linkages between large and small rms. Therefore, input credit is the
key amplication channel by which nancial development can lead to lower unemployment
volatility.
Importantly, note that a reduction in unemployment volatility tied to nancial devel-
opment is not due to an increase in sectoral (and aggregate) real-wage volatility. In fact,
as shown in Figure 4, both wage and unemployment volatility fall as a result of nancial
development. This result consistent with the evidence in Boz, Durdu, and Li (2015), who
document that advanced economies have, on average, lower real wage volatility relative to
emerging economies.
In sum, our results suggest that both nancial development as reected in a higher
aggregate bank credit share and rmsdomestic external nancing structure especially as
it relates to the degree of dependency on interrm input-credit relationships among small
rms are critical to shed light on the link between domestic nancial development and
unemployment volatility.
3.5 Nested Models and Robustness Analysis
In what follows, we present evidence that supports our framework and assumptions on het-
erogeneity across rm categories in their nancial structure and borrowing capacity by show-
ing that simpler models either underperform in matching important facts compared to our
benchmark specication or fail to replicate the empirical relationship between nancial de-
velopment and unemployment volatility. In particular, we consider (1) a version of our model
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with the same borrowing capacity parameter across rm categories (that is, l = s = )
(Model l = s = ); (2) a version of our model without input credit linkages (i.e., ! = 1
for all t) and therefore no small rm owners os (No ! and No os) (without loss of gener-
ality, we show the results under a change in s for nested model (2), but the same results
hold under a change in l); and (3) a standard one-sector model with collateral constraints
(One Sector Model).28 All of these models are nested within our benchmark framework.
First, Table 6 compares business cycle moments across models to our benchmark model.
Second, Figures 5 and 6 plot equilibrium bank credit-GDP ratio and unemployment volatility
for di¤erent l, s, and k,  (= l = s) and k, or , depending on whether nested model
(1), (2), or (3), respectively, is under consideration. For reference, the top panel of Figure 5
plots outcomes for the benchmark model.
Table 6: Business Cycle Statistics, Data vs. Benchmark Model and Nested Models
A. Targeted moments
Statistic yt i;t (yt; yt 1) (wt; yt)
Data 2:390 6:644 0:750 0:560
Model 2:390 6:644 0:745 0:566
B. Non-targeted moments
Statistic c;t w;t ut (nl;t; yt) (ns;t; yt) (ut; yt) (ut;ut 1) (tbt=yt; yt)
Data 3:011 4:701 20:66 0:740  0:470  0:780 0:840  0:750
Benchmark Model 2:814 3:441 0:764 0:645  0:168  0:549 0:874  0:333
Model l = s =  3:045 3:667 0:912 0:632  0:287  0:512 0:838  0:263
No ! and No os 1:768 3:868 1:196 0:426 0:025  0:132 0:486 0:658
One Sector Model 1:768 3:911 0:748 0:664    0:446 0:835 0:671
Notes: x refers to the standard deviation of variable x. (x; y) refers to the correlation of x with y. All
second moments for the model are obtained using ltered series to make them comparable to the data. The
empirical moments for large-rm and small-rm employment are based on data from Mexicos employment
survey (ENEU). The empirical volatility of consumption and wages, the cyclicality of unemployment, and
the persistence of output and unemployment are from Boz, Durdu, and Li (2015).
28Nested model (2) is a simple two-sector model where the only di¤erences between smalland large
rms are di¤erences in exogenous sectoral productivity and steady-state borrowing capacity. Both rm
categories have the same production technology (with internally-accumulated capital and labor as inputs).
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Per Table 6, the model under identical borrowing capacity parameters across rm cate-
gories does well in replicating key second moments but, importantly, as shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 5, this model cannot generate the relationships between nancial devel-
opment and unemployment volatility observed in the data. In fact, counter to the data,
unemployment volatility is actually rising in borrowing capacity regardless of the level of k.
Figure 5: Impact of changes in key parameter values on the steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio and unem-
ployment volatility (benchmark model and alternative model with common borrowing capacity).
This counterfactual result is also observed in Figure 6 resulting from the one-sector
model and the model that abstracts from input credit. As shown in Table 6, these models
also perform worse in matching key second moments for Mexico compared to the benchmark
model. (Note that Figure 6 presents results in 2 dimensions only since the models presented
in this gure abstract from input credit, and therefore from the parameter k).
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Figure 6: Impact of changes in key parameter values on the steady-state bank credit-GDP ratio and unem-
ployment volatility (no-input-credit and one-sector models).
Taken together, these results stress the importance of heterogeneity in domestic external
nancing structure and borrowing capacity in order to successfully replicate the cross-country
patterns in the data, as is the case with the benchmark model.
Table A4 in the Appendix presents additional results that compare business cycle mo-
ments from the benchmark model under the baseline calibration to: (1) the benchmark
model with productivity and foreign interest rate shocks but no borrowing capacity (nan-
cial) shocks; (2) the benchmark model with only productivity shocks; (3) the benchmark
model with linear vacancy posting costs; (4) the benchmark model where input credit can
be pledged as collateral as well;29 and (5) the benchmark model with costly nancial inter-
29Campello and Larrain (2014) document how a number of countries implemented reforms that expanded
the set of assets acceptable as collateral. This set included movable assets. Love, Martínez Pería, and Singh
(2013) document that a number of countries have improved collateral registries, which facilitates the use of
movable assets for collateral and relaxes the constraints imposed by existing collateral requirements.
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mediation that gives rise to lending-deposit spreads as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) (see
the Appendix for more details). All of these model variants are able to match key second mo-
ments for Mexico.30 These alternative specications of the benchmark model also generate
the factual changes in unemployment volatility under nancial development, except for the
models where business cycles are driven by TFP shocks only or by TFP shocks and foreign
interest rate shocks (see Figures A1 through A4 in the Appendix). Therefore, these results
suggest that in order to match the facts regarding unemployment volatility, the presence of
domestic nancial shocks plays an important role when nancial development is driven by
improvements in bank borrowing.
4 Conclusions
Using a sample of advanced economies (AEs) and developing and emerging economies (DEMEs),
we document a novel and robust signicant negative relationship between improvements in
bank credit-GDP ratios which is a dening characteristic of domestic nancial development
and unemployment volatility in DEMEs, but not in AEs. In order to better understand the
potential linkages between nancial development and labor-market dynamics, we develop a
business cycle search model with rm heterogeneity, external nancing structure, and sec-
toral collateral constraints.
Analysis of the model shows that an improvement in rmsborrowing capacity boosts
the accumulation of capital, which makes rms more resilient to credit disruptions and
30However, while nancial shocks help in generating a relative volatility of wages greater than 1, standard
foreign interest rate shocks cannot. This stands in contrast with Boz, Durdu, and Li (2015) and is a
consequence of our two-sector structure and the presence of nancial frictions.
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stabilizes the demand for input credit. These dynamics make vacancy postings, and therefore,
unemployment, less volatile for any given set of shocks. The quantitative magnitude of this
mechanism is increasing in the degree of input credit in an economy. Therefore, input credit
represents a key amplication channel by which nancial development can lead to lower
unemployment volatility. In fact, for a su¢ ciently low degree of input credit the relationship
between nancial development and unemployment volatility is for all purposes mute.
Input credit is, empirically, a much more important characteristic of rm structure in
DEMEs compared to AEs. Therefore, the model suggests that the lack of a statistically
signicant relationship between nancial development and unemployment volatility in AEs
owes to the fact that in these economies input credit is much less prominent than in DEMEs,
and the reverse logic applies to DEMEs. This backdrop may have important implications
for credit-market stabilization policies across economies that di¤er in their rmsnancing
structure. We plan to explore these issues in future work.
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